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Context
Infrastructure Characteristics
restrict to physical infrastructure
cost structure
substantial
irreversible
economies of scale
network effects
volatile utilisation
means capacity is not 1:1 with usage
means investment is risky
intermodal competition
Economies of scale and uncertainty pose particular issues
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Sources of Volatility
Demand and Cost
DEMAND is volatile although it varies across infrastructures:
electricity lines: is low (managed)
telecom exchange much higher (less managed)
gas
COSTS
technological change
construction costs
input prices
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Demand Volatility
Example Gas Demand Volatility
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Volatility in Network Costs
For the same quality?: vary with (PBA (2004))
1 price of inputs, such as labour and materials
2 the level of competition and with the level of supply and
demand;
3 project size;
4 the location of the project;
5 with legal and regulatory requirements, and constraints
imposed by local authorities;
6 as between new construction sites and established locations;
7 design and construction standards; and
8 with the efficiency of the project and contract management.
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Cost Volatility
Examples
Transit NZ (2006) for thirty projects in Auckland Wellington
and Christchurch: range of tenders is 26% of the maximum
tender.
PWC (2004) Data on project quotes for or four categories of
investment across six lines companies
Variation Undergrnd. Tnsfm.UpGd 11kV urban 11kV rural
Coefficient of 17.8% 40.1% 27.8% 27.62%
Looking forward there is uncertainty about technological
change effects on costs
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Project Evaluation
Variance matters:
The social cost-benefit criterion
is the expected net present value of total surplus
must reflect demand response to costs including external costs
(congestion) and quality
timing of infrastructure investment is one of the critical
elements
is affected by volatility
affects the timing of investment
larger the volatility the more valuable the option to “wait”
is another reason why demand affecting instruments are
important
interacts with economies of scale to affect the quantum of
investment
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Natural Monopoly
Reconciliation of Static and Dynamic Origins
Traditional static natural monopoly theory:
fixed costs plus low marginal costs imply
declining average cost
pricing must be above marginal cost
But where does declining cost come from?
organisational economies: unlikely given capital intensity
input price scale effects
economies of scale in investment
Economies of scale in investment
Definition: the larger the investment to expand services the
lower the average incremental cost
Add that the investment is irreversible (sunk)
Accords with the static form of natural monoply
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Economies of Scale
Arises in a wide range of investment
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Investment Rule
Demand must be met
Capacity s depreciates
Demand x is volatile
Investment with economies of scale:
investing extinguishes the option to wait: but may lose cost
benefits of scale economies
invest more than meets demand at the time of investment
Lewis EvansVictoria University of Wellington, New Zealand Infrastructure Investment and Uncertainty
Context:
Volatility
Project Evaluation
Economies of Scale
Investment Issues
Final Comment
Investment Issues: Replacement Cost Pricing
Value of the Firm: as output varies over fixed (sunk) capacity (100): capital base is
optimised replacement, cost and demand uncertain
 Firm Value 
Demand 
No Scale Economies: willing to startup and 
continue (invest) 
ORC 
 
Scale Economies: willing to startup but 
not continue (invest)  
Scale Economies: willing to startup and 
continue ( invest) 
 
 
Continue operation: Sunk capital disallowed   0  100 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Summary
Replacement cost pricing: serve all customers no feedback
economies of scale imply investment conflict; unless
allowed an unrealistically high high rate of return, or
subsidy as in the static model
Replacement cost pricing: invest excess demand threshold:
substitutes consumer loss for financial loss or subsidy
requires shortage allocation mechanism for consumers
prices have the usual advantages of
efficient allocation among consumers
revealing quantified demand for the infrastructure investment
cases where prices may reduce the incentive to invest at the
right time.
Historical-cost pricing: shifts risk to consumers, leaves the
scale/risk trade-off
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Institutional Settings Affect Investment
Risk, and economies of scale taken as given
generally pure private investment
must prospectively be funded by consumer charges (demand)
and subsidy
difficult to fund on historical cost
consumers carry all the risk
who determines investment?
congestion price
carries most of the risk
-enables contestability where feasible
generally mixed private investment plus government
choice of historical cost or replacement cost pricing
conjestion pricing
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Final Comment
Volatility engenders much uncertainty, affects timing of
socially optimal investment
Economies of scale are widely present and affect policy toward
infrastructure
Treatment of demand is critical to efficient investment in
infrastructure
Where economically possible demand should be sensitised to
cost and benefits by pricing
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